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At the very beginning of Less than Nothing, Slavoj Žižek states that his aim is 
not simply to return to Hegel but, more broadly, to repeat Hegel (Žižek, 2012: 
18). This cuts against the grain of much of contemporary philosophy that 
tends to see in Hegel an elaborate, but unsuccessful, attempt to develop a 
holistic idealism. This is exemplified in one of the most recent trends in 
philosophy, that of speculative realism, spearheaded by Quentin Meillasoux. 
For Meillasoux, the problem with Hegel is that,  
 
the necessity of contingency is not derived from contingency as such 
and contingency alone, but from a Whole that is ontologically superior to 
the latter.. This is precisely what separates the factial from the dialectical 
– or to put it more generally…what separates the speculative from the 
metaphysical. (Meillasoux, 2011: 80) 
 
This paper seeks to address why, and how, Žižek continues to view Hegel’s 
philosophy as more relevant than ever. Through an analysis of Meillasoux’s 
break with ‘the Kantian problematic’, it will explore the way in which Žižek 
articulates a Hegelian approach to the question of contingency. From here it 
moves to an analysis of the classical (pre-Socratic) notion of Den and to how 





Romancing the Bone - Meillasoux’s Anti-Correlationalism 
 
Meillasoux begins with a basic deconstruction of the correlation/absolute 
distinction. Correlationalism affirms the finitude of our understanding and 
engagement with the world. But if all understanding is limited by the correlate 
(the ‘for us’), then this limitation is an absolute one. Meillasoux thus takes the 
opposite stance of Rorty. Where Rorty maintains the need to come to terms 
with the finitude of our engagement with the world (through the correlates of 
language, culture, history and so on), Meillasoux argues that it is through this 
finitude that we acquire ‘the absolute knowledge that the world might be other 
than we think’ (Harman, 2011: 27-28). It is precisely because every finitude 
(correlate) is an inherent failure – i.e. a delimitation of possibilities that exceed 
it – that a path to the absolute is opened. But, as he points out, ‘it is not the 
correlation but the facticity of the correlation that constitutes the absolute’ 
(Meillasoux, 2011: 52). In other words, it is the radical ontological contingency 
(facticity) of the correlate – i.e. that the in-itself can always be something other 
than the given – that renders the absolute.  
 
Meillasoux does not return to any philosophy of a substance-behind-the-veil, 
but neither does he remain within the confines of standard correlationalism. 
By changing the terms of engagement, the correlationalist limitation becomes 
the very point of escape via the affirmation of radical facticity: 
  
facticity will be revealed to be a knowledge of the absolute because we 
are going to put back into the thing itself what we mistakenly took to be 
an incapacity in thought. In other words, instead of construing the 
absence of reason inherent in everything as a limit that thought 
encounters in its search for the ultimate reason, we must understand 
that this absence is, and can only be the ultimate property of the entity. 
We must convert facticity into the real property whereby everything and 
every world is without reason, and is thereby capable of actually 
becoming otherwise without reason. (Meillasoux, 2011: 53) 
 
Notwithstanding the absoluteness of contingency and the elevation of 
ignorance to an ontological principle (the apprehension that reality can be 
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other), Meillasoux insists upon privileging one form of discourse that is able to 
slice through all correlational ambiguity and open a gateway to the great 
outdoors: the discourse of science. Science is distinguished from all other 
discourses because of its ability to provide access to what he calls the 
ancestral. Ancestrality refers to a time that existed before our being and 
consciousness and thus, by definition, a non-correlated time – a kind of mute 
existence untouched by human mediation that is empirically indicated by 
prehistoric bones and fossils. Indeed his entire project appears to boil down to 
a kind of reclaiming of a substantialist (uncorrelated) form of ontology: 
  
I refuse this ‘Real without realism’, because if I don’t have a rational 
procedure to discover specific properties of the Real, those properties 
threaten to be arbitrarily posited. (Meillasoux in Brassier et al, 2007: 435) 
 
He goes on to say that ‘what contemporary philosophy lacks is not so much 
the Real as realism: the Real with realism is the true challenge of philosophy’ 
(Meillasoux et al, 2007: 435). Everything here depends on the status of the 
Real. For Meillasoux, the Real is something that can be captured, and 
represented, in positive terms by the realism of scientific thought. Through a 
continuous refinement of its discourse, science is able to advance upon its 
quarry of the ‘specific properties of the Real’. Although Meillasoux divests the 
world of any underlying or hidden Reason – there is only the ‘manifest 
gratuitousness of the given’ (Meillasoux, 2011: 63) - he nonetheless maintains 
a rather traditional view that the world can be divided in terms of reality and 
appearance, or what he calls primary qualities (i.e. properties of the Real) and 
secondary qualities (i.e. sensible/pathological properties). Scientific discourse 
is able to strip away the secondary qualities of appearance and to get at the 
primary non-pathological (or uncorrelated) properties. Substance re-emerges 
here not so much as a fundamental entity but as a kind of consistency of form 
to contingent phenomena which science and, in particular, mathematics can 
access and codify the infrastructure of all being.  
 
For Meillasoux, the very positing of the gap as a transcendental becomes 
itself a way of bridging the gap in positive terms. The Real (what there is 
 4 
whether ‘we are or not’) and the entire datum of unreason qua contingency 
are effectively re-mastered by rational determination. Does this not reflect a 
rather classical Enlightenment ambition: i.e. to overcome all remnants of the 
mystical and to establish the reign of (scientific) reason? In eschewing the 
absolute, Western critical (correlationist) reason has created a climate of 
cynicism and ironic distancing which has inadvertently opened up the very 
space for new types of dogmatism and revelatory ideologies to flourish. 
Through its abandonment of the in-itself, modern philosophy has allowed the 
absolute to become further mystified and to become prone to all those 
discourses (cults, fanaticisms, neo-fascisms and so on) that would make 
some claim to it. It is crucial, therefore, to reclaim the absolute within the 
terms of universal reason (Meillasoux, 2011: 49). In fact, Meillasoux’s vision 
could be considered to be even grander than that expressed in Enlightenment 
thought. On the basis of absolute factiality, where there can be no destiny or 
necessary entities, Meillasoux affirms the possibility of a future World of 
justice (beyond matter, life and thought) in which the dead could be 
resurrected to a state of immortality and where a virtual God (or even Gods) 
can arise as ‘the last-born of humans’ (Meillasoux in Harman, 2011: 231).  
The real problem in Meillasoux is arguably the opposite one. That is to say, it 
is because so much emphasis is placed on the virtues of practical empirico-
scientific engagement that the more abstract dimensions tend to be sidelined, 
put into parenthesis. This is reflected in his assertion that we need to ‘revoke 
the transcendental’ (Meillasoux, 2011: 26). For Meillasoux, the transcendental 
– and, in particular, the transcendental subject - can only be thought as 
something that ‘takes place’ under concrete spatio-temporal circumstances 
(Meillasoux, 2011: 24-26). The transcendental is thus conceived as something 
secondary to, a function of, the ‘time of science’ (i.e. the contingent interplay 
of objects and circumstances). The ‘time of science’ emerges precisely at the 
point where the transcendental exhausts itself and is shown to depend on 
particular conditions of possibility.  
Yet does not Meillasoux already rely upon an implicit notion of the 
transcendental: i.e. contingency itself as a transcendental, or absolute, 
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exception? Moreover, does contingency constitute the absolute as such? Both 
Meillasoux and Badiou share a view of contingency-as-absolute (though in 
different ways) and to present this in terms of a mathematized infinity. For 
Badiou it is presented as the multiplicity of multiplicities where being is 
conceived as ‘a mathematically thinkable pure multiplicity’ (Badiou, 2011: 30). 
For Meillasoux it is the idea that ‘whatever is mathematically conceivable is 
absolutely possible’ (Meillasoux, 2011: 117). From any starting point, we can 
proceed in an infinity of directions with an infinity of sequential permutations 
and outcomes. In the Cantorian sense, every infinity leads to another infinity.  
The problem that emerges here is a conceptual separateness where infinity 
tends to be viewed implicitly as something over and above the given and 
which, in some sense, can be grasped in mathematical terms. Hegel 
approaches this problem in a different way, beginning with the question of 
otherness: the other is always-already internally inscribed and the in-itself is 
precisely the constitutive failure of something to be itself in positive terms. 
Things always indicate an other; an other which is also something and which 
in turn indicates a further other and so on ad infinitum (Hegel, 1991: 149).  
Yet for Hegel this conception of infinity as an unending number of instances 
and combinations, which is simply opposed to the finite in positive-
independent terms, is a spurious one (Hegel, 1991: 149). It does not touch 
upon the true dimension of infinity. One should not approach infinity in terms 
of multiplicities that simply over-run any singularity or finite-ness. In the first 
place, infinity should not be thought of as something above or apart from 
finitude. It is not as if ‘one is situated here, and the other over there’, it is 
rather that ‘the True, or the genuine Infinity, is determined and expressed as 
the unity of the infinite and the finite’ (Hegel, 1991: 151 & 152). But this ‘unity’ 
is not any kind of identity, but precisely the opposite: it is the name of a radical 
tension, or impossibility, that forever bars any identity as such (in this sense it 
has the same kind of structural logic of Lacan’s subject-subjectivity ‘unity’). In 
other words, infinity grows out of finitude (and vice versa). Infinity emerges as 
a consequence of the failure of the finite to fully constitute itself; it is the 
inherent dimension of impossibility-negativity in every finite. Likewise, the 
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finite is not an independent actuality but a continuous process of re-
constitution against the infinite threat of immanent dissolution.  Thus it is not a 
question of a finite combination of multiples versus an unending multiplicity of 
possible combinations, but rather that every multiplicity is itself 
sustained/generated by an infinite ‘singularity’: the persistence of an infinite 
self-relating negativity within the finite. Put in Lacanian terms, the infinite 
arises as the not-all of the finite (and vice versa).  
And this is why for Lacan ‘mathematization alone reaches a Real’ (Lacan, 
1999: 131). But the Real here is nothing substantial, and certainly not any pre-
subjective or pre-discursive reality. The Real that mathematics is able to give 
expression to is not anything substantial or pre-given but precisely the 
opposite: it is incompleteness, inconsistency and lack. What mathematics 
achieves is the ‘signifying of dispersal and unraveling’ (Lacan, 1999: 128). Far 
from capturing any solid non-correlated ground on which to base a diachronic 
narrative of development, mathematics marks the very point(s) at which 
fantasy has to intervene in order to patch up the inherent inconsistencies of 
reality. More generally, what follows from this is that science (in its everyday 
applied forms) functions ultimately along fantasmatic lines. That is to say, 
science serves to generate/reproduce an autopoietic consistency that is 
capable of rendering ‘reality’ as something communicable as a field of 
effectivity (Lacan, 1993: 63).  Science, like the language of Joyce, has a self-
referential structure where terms like ‘atom’, ‘electron’, ‘quark’ and so on, only 
make sense as relational categories (Lacan, 1999: 36).   
Other examples might include the use of satellite navigation, the conducting of 
surgical operations remotely via robotic technology and so forth. The point is 
that with science and technology what we have are self-referring networks of 
signification (information data, instrumentation etc.) that not only provide 
consistency to the order of being but which enable the pursuit of human 
objectives. Science is incapable of yielding the signatura rerum or any 
externally given reality. Rather science weaves its signification(s) for ‘the 
world’ in such a way that human endeavour and purpose is rendered 
effectual. This is why Lacan conceives the subject of science as the subject of 
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unconscious: i.e. the subject of science is coterminous with signification as 
such and behind which there is nothing. Scientific discourse, in this sense, is 
always in medias res and makes no purchase on anything outside of its own 
paradigmatic terms. In this regard, Meillasoux’s ‘time of science’ – where 
there is an immediate access to pre-discursive reality – is strictly a fantasy. 
On these grounds, Meillasoux’s conceptualization of contingency is similarly 
flawed. Contingency emerges in Meillasoux as the exception. Everything is 
subject to contingency except contingency itself, and thus contingency is 
ascribed the status of an absolute that is set apart. But from a Hegelian 
perspective this leads inevitably to an idealization of contingency; precisely, 
the necessity of contingency. In Hegel contingency is not something that can 
be set apart as a self-constituting exception, and thus it cannot be considered 
absolute or necessary. On the contrary, what is necessary is not contingency 
but internal differentiation where every particular thing is, in its very essence, 
constituted in and through its relation with its other. This means that finitude 
does not mark any external or temporal frontier - that can be overcome 
potentially through science and mathematics - between givenness and 
independent (pre-/post- subjective) reality. Just as finitude already holds 
infinitude (self-relating negativity) within itself (and vice versa), so too 
contingency and necessity should be thought together. Contingency arises 
because of the necessary constitutive failure of necessity to establish itself in 
its own (absolute) terms; necessity arises because of the contingent 
dislocation(s) that inhere as a necessary possibility within contingency as-
such. As Žižek puts it, what we are confronted with is the mutually 
interdependent and constitutive not-All of both necessity and contingency: 
Not-All is necessary, which means that, from time to time, a contingent 
encounter occurs which undermines the predominant necessity (the 
space of possibilities sustained by this necessity), so that in it, the 
“impossible” happens. How do these two non-Alls relate? Since reality 
is contingent, we should begin with the non-All of contingency: it is out 




The Big Idea 
Something similar can be said about the traditional subjective/objective 
distinction. Hegel makes clear that it is absurd to ‘to consider subjectivity and 
objectivity as a fixed and abstract antithesis’ (Hegel, 1991: 273). Rather we 
should consider the two as dialectical moments of each other where 
objectivity functions as the other of subjectivity and vice versa. This also 
informs Hegel’s approach to the Idea: 
The Concept, which is initially only subjective, proceeds to objectify 
itself by virtue of its own activity and without the help of an external 
material or stuff. And likewise the object is not rigid and without 
process; instead, its process consists in its proving itself to be that 
which is at the same time subjective, and this forms the advance to the 
Idea. (addition in Hegel, 1991: 273). 
The Idea is a kind of logic of objectification without any object; it is processual 
not given or substantial. There is no external criterion or measure that is 
already there awaiting discovery. The point of ‘origin’ is rather a pure posited-
ness or mediated-ness as such. In this regard, the human condition is one of 
ongoing processes of differentiation(s) that enable the effective navigation of 
such mediated-ness. Through science, art, philosophy, politics and so on, the 
mysterious alien character of ‘nature’ is overcome/sublated in the pursuit of 
historical objectives. 
The Idea effectively recasts objectivity (the sense of the external) in a way 
that reveals the paradigmatic form of conceptual-subjective engagement. The 
Idea is manifested as the essential unity of Concept and objectivity and as the 
unity of the ideal and the real (Hegel, 1991: 286 & 288). In its mute existence, 
the objective realm of ‘nature’ is experienced as an absolute externality, the 
negation of subjectivity. Through dialectical engagement, this experience is 
sublated – there is a negation of the negation – and a consequent 
transformation of both subjectivity and objectivity. Subjectivity does not simply 
become reconciled with objectivity (as if mastering the mysteries that are 
already there); nor is there – which amounts to the same thing – an ideal 
synthesis of subjective-objective relations. In this regard, Hegel’s philosophy 
is not interpretivist. That is to say, it is not as if things happen objectively, in a 
realm of actuality, and which are then interpreted through subjective 
 9 
discourse. The point is that the very experience of objectivity already depends 
upon a certain subjective inscription, or what Lacan calls the gaze (where the 
‘I’ is already included in the picture). The Idea, in this sense, signals mediate-
ness as such and gives rise to its own sense of immediacy (or objective 
encounter). An eclipse of the Sun, for example, is experienced in its very 
objective immediacy as a certain kind of event from the position of subjective 
engagement (location, perceptual capability and all the forms of meaning – 
portent, horror, wonder, scientific opportunity etc. – that constitute its event-
ness). 
This distinguishes Hegel from the postmodern thought of people like Rorty 
who tend to retain an implicit form of Kantian noumenality: i.e. that although 
we are bound by interpretivist discourse there is nonetheless a world ‘out 
there’ that exists in independent (unknowable) terms. For Hegel any such 
independence is a delusion. Just as the north and south poles of a magnet 
exist only in relation to each other, being itself can only be achieved through 
the basic principle of distinction (i.e. through constitutive otherness). 
Developing this metaphor further, we might say that reality itself is structured 
as a kind of magnetic field that is generated by the scissional tension between 
the poles of subjectivity and objectivity. These poles have no particular 
content in and of themselves, yet their mutual dependence and mutual 
thwarting is capable nevertheless of producing a tensional field of 
phenomenal reality. 
It is against this background that we can understand Hegel’s notion of the 
absolute Idea. The absolute Idea has no content of its own but rather reflects 
the point at which content passes over into a pure kind of form that is revealed 
as for-itself, or as self-reproducing. What is shown in the absolute Idea is not 
anything substantial but its very ‘system of determinations’ or ‘currency of 
moments’ (Hegel, 1991: 304). The absolute Idea represents the point at which 
the subject-object field of reality is perceived/experienced as something that is 
delimited as a frame of being. It is the whole that organizes and makes sense 
of the particular moments as a characteristic for-itself economy/configuration. 
In a way, it is both pure form and pure content. That is to say, the absolute 
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Idea expresses both the nature of form as a particular kind of content (i.e. 
delimitation as such as the universal content) and of content as a particular 
kind of form (the characteristic articulation of its moments as universal form). 
What is real for Hegel is the process of differentiation as such, and the 
delimited fields of differentiation that emerge from it historically in the guise of 
necessity. 
‘Absolute knowing’ in Hegel has, consequently, nothing to do with ‘knowing 
everything’ (Solomon, 1983: 639). It is not a question of a development in the 
quantity of knowledge but of its quality (Solomon in Solomon & Higgins eds, 
2003: 193-194). Absolute knowing is rather the recognition of the absolute 
limitation of the frame of being as such. The In-itself can never be grasped in 
a tangible sense because the In-itself is nothing but the frame of being 
produced through delimitation. Put in other terms, what absolute knowing 
‘finds’ ultimately in the search for the In-itself is the field (or field-ness) of the 
search itself. 
Meillasoux’s desire to throw open the doors to the great outside is thus a false 
undertaking. We might say that he remains too wedded to the quantitative 
model of knowledge – where science is viewed as something that gains 
progressively on the uncorrelated real – and misses precisely this qualitative 
shift in the unfolding of knowledge towards an appreciation of absolute 
limitation. In Lacanian terms, what is missed is an appreciation of the Real-as-
absolute limit; as something that is coterminous with, and constitutive of, the 
field of knowledge as such. The problem of epistemology is thus ultimately a 
problem of ontology. This has been demonstrated in the quantum physics of 
people like Niels Bohr who has shown how the more science closes in on the 
basic units of material existence; the more indeterminate they become (Barad, 
2007: 127-28). It is not that epistemology reaches a certain limit while reality 
remains ‘out there’ in full independent terms (so that we have multiple 
‘interpretations’ of something that already exists); it is rather that reality itself 
is ontologically, and constitutively, incomplete. The indeterminacy and 
incompleteness of reality cannot be epistemologically overcome (however far 
into the future); they are rather the very in-itself of reality as such. Nor is this a 
 11 
problem that can be resolved by trying to eradicate the subjective dimension 
with a view to distilling the purely objective. As Žižek argues, 
“objective reality” (the way we construct it through science) is a Real 
which cannot be experienced as reality. In its effort to grasp reality 
“independently of me”, mathematized science erases ‘me’ from reality, 
ignoring (not the transcendental way I constitute reality, but) the way I 
am part of this reality’ (Žižek, 2012: 924). 
This evidently does not mean that everything can be reduced to subjective 
points-of-view - this would result in a banal form of perspectivism (Deleuze, 
1972). The point is rather that subjectivity and objectivity are inextricably 
bound up with each other. Objectivism and subjectivism are equal impostors 
in this sense.  
 
 
From Meillasoux to M-theory - Hegel in the Eleventh Dimension 
 
Despite his stated intentions, Meillasoux does not appear to escape the 
Kantian universe. For Kant, the in-itself (or objective reason) resides in an 
independent noumenal sphere that is shrouded in eternal mystery. The world 
can only be experienced as a correlate of limited subjective engagement that 
can never arrive at the level of objective reason. Meillasoux argues that by 
maintaining the facticity of the correlate, the inherent incapacity to access 
objective reason actually becomes the way out - the Kantian incapacity is 
merely a reflection of a basic absence of reason. The absolute is nothing but 
this absence. It is on this basis that Meillasoux wishes to restore science and 
mathematics to their proper status as disciplines capable of disclosing the 
primary properties of un-reason and of describing the work of radical 
contingency in a way that transcends the given or subjective.  
 
Yet Meillasoux’s critique of Kant only goes so far. That is to say, his absolute 
refers only to the subjective side of matters, not to the objective or substantial 
side. By elevating our incapacity to find objective reason to the level of the 
transcendental, contingency itself is made the ideal object of knowledge; 
something which is subject to the privileged jurisdiction of mathematical 
encoding. The very thing that remains an ontological constitutive limit for 
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subjectivity (i.e. radical contingency) is consequently re-epistemologized as a 
problem that is solvable ultimately through enlightened science (the Real as 
reconciled with realism). In this sense, Meillasoux de-Kantianizes 
metaphysics but only to re-Kantianize science.  
 
Hegel, by contrast, marshals a two-sided approach and effectively dissolves 
the Kantian universe through the affirmation that both subjectivity and 
objectivity are traversed by the same lack/negativity. For Hegel there is no 
self-contained world or independent outdoors that can be accessed. As he 
puts it, both subject and substance need to be thought together:  
  
The disparity which exists in consciousness between the ‘I’ and the 
substance which is its object is the distinction between them, the 
negative in general. This can be regarded as the defect of both, though 
it is their soul, or that which moves them. That is why some of the 
ancients conceived the void as the principle of motion, for they rightly 
saw the moving principle as the negative, though they did not as yet 
grasp that the negative is the self. Now, although this negative appears 
at first as a disparity between the ‘I’ and its object, it is just a much a 
disparity of the substance with itself. Thus what seems to happen 
outside of it, to be an activity directed against it, is really its own doing, 
and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject. (Hegel, 1977: 21). 
 
The outcome of the processes by which this insight is historically realized – 
i.e. that substance is essentially subject – results finally in a manifestation of 
objective spirit. The truth of the phenomenology of spirit is something that 
shows itself in the ‘form of simplicity which knows its object as its own self’ 
(Hegel, 1977: 22). Does this amount to a teleology (as many commentators 
have claimed) in which there is ultimate reconciliation between subject and 
substance. Do these processes result in a ‘pure form’ whose moments are 
‘necessary and eternally stable’ (Harris, 1997: 88). Put another way, is this the 
highest expression of idealism? 
  
In fact, Hegel breaks decisively not only with the Kantian opposition between 
subjectivity and substance qua external (noumenal) entities, but also with the 
entire idealist problematic. In Hegel, subject and substance do not stand 
independently of each other, and neither has a positive content of its own. 
 13 
There exists rather an economy of movement between subject and 
substance. This economy remains impossible in the sense that there is no 
final outcome other than the disclosing of its own economization as such. For 
Hegel, essence is this economy. Subject and substance do not achieve any 
simple unity or identity; subject is not absorbed into substance (e.g. as human 
genome), nor is substance absorbed into subject (e.g. as generator of reality). 
There is not, in other words, a dialectical unfolding towards an absolute; 
rather the absolute is the dialectical unfolding itself.  
 
In his analysis of the various forms of judgement (the interplay of the Concept 
and its particularities), Hegel shows how the subject is linked to some form of 
finitude – its content relies upon particular predicates either positively (‘the 
rose is red’) or negatively (‘the rose is not red’). In a sense, the subject and 
the predicate may be said to be always in a game of tag with each other and 
only touch each other at certain points. The subject can be said to be 
universal insofar as it can always escape its particular predicative contents. 
On the other hand, the predicate can be viewed as universal because it can 
always outrun any particular subject (it can be applied more broadly). There is 
a basic ambiguity which means that everything depends on circumstance. But 
when it comes to the infinite judgement, things stand very differently. In infinite 
judgement there exists an ‘empty identity-relation’ which finds expression in 
such propositions as ‘the spirit is not an elephant’ or ‘the spirit is spirit’; 
propositions which are ‘correct but pointless’ (Hegel, 1991: 250). 
 
These forms of infinite judgement – which collapse in on themselves and 
thereby reveal the empty form of all judgements – express ‘the total 
incommensurability of the subject and the predicate’ (Hegel, 1991: 250). In 
other words, the subject exemplifies an impenetrable self-relating negativity 
that can never be fully captured or configured within predicative substance. 
But again, this does not mean that subject is independent of substance-
predicate. Hegel is very precise in his use of the term ‘incommensurability’. 
The subject is ultimately revealed in this form as a result of the inability of 
substance to complete itself. Subject emerges as the feral excess of the 
movements of substance.  
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Meillasoux reflects a long-standing Enlightenment tradition where the subject 
– from Marx’s universal class to Habermas’ collective rational communicator 
through to Fukuyama’s last man of history (and Meillasoux’s own version of 
this where ‘God will be the last born of humans’) – is viewed as capable of 
overcoming all alienation from the substance. But for Hegel, the point is rather 
that substance is already alienated in-itself and the subject is precisely an 
effect of this alienation. As he puts it, 
  
the living Substance is being which is in truth Subject, or, what is the 
same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement positing itself, 
or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself. The Substance is, as 
Subject, pure, simple negativity, and is for this very reason the 
bifurcation of the simple; it is the doubling which sets up opposition, and 
then again the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its anti-thesis 
(the immediate simplicity). Only this self-restoring same-ness, or this 
reflection of otherness within itself – not an original or immediate unity as 
such – is the True. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle that 
presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and 
only by being worked out to its end, is it actual. (Hegel, 1997: 10).  
 
In showing the essential connectedness of subject and substance through 
non-identity, Hegel advances beyond Kant. Subject is not a separate entity, 
but the inherent negativity of substance itself. Equally, substance has no 
independence ‘out there’; it is rather a continuous process of differentiation 
driven by this negativity. When Harris speaks of Hegel as positing a ‘self-
moving substance’ (1997: 87), we should perhaps add two further points: first, 
in its basic nature, substance is nothing but movement; second, this 
movement is generated by a kind of absolute inertia: namely, inward 
opposition and the essential failure of substance to achieve full being. 
Contradiction itself becomes that which ‘moves the world’ (addition in Hegel, 
1991: 187). 
 
From this point of view, science cannot be regarded as a continuum of neutral 
knowledge that gains progressively on an indifferent world/substance; 
precisely because there is nothing substantial to be gained. We cannot 
penetrate to an underlying pre-subjective reality because we are already 
included within the negativity that moves the world and thus do not have an 
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independent standpoint. In this sense, we are always in a condition of being in 
medias res. The first quantum theorist, Max Planck, also makes this point: 
‘Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature. And that is because, in 
the last analysis, we ourselves are part of nature and therefore part of the 
mystery that we are trying to solve’ (Planck, 1981: 217). 
 
The move from Kant to Hegel is something that continues to be played out at 
every level in science. That is to say, what science is tending to reveal is not 
the structure of an indifferent external world, but rather a world without form or 
purpose and without any independent markers of certainty; in short, science is 
revealing the nature of substance as subject. Not only do we have ‘ecology 
without nature’ (Morton, 2007), we also have bio-engineering without Biology 
(the capacity to directly synthetize bacterium and to create living forms), 
neuro-science without experience (the direct instilling of states of 
consciousness), mathematics without order (the capacity to manipulate the 
world through meaningless numbers/formulae) right through to quantum 
physics and its affirmation of the inherent indeterminacy of all reality (creating 
the possibility of artificially generating universes without God). In this context, 
Nature is dissolving and the world (to borrow a term from Kant) is being 
rendered increasingly sublime. Far from apprehending any ideal in Nature, 
science is revealing the unsettling presence of the void that, in turn, de-
idealizes science as such: i.e. it shows it to be part of mediated-ness without 
any external point of reflection. 
 
In other words, science is not gravitating towards any teleological outcome or 
hidden substantialization but rather the Hegelian absolute. What is being 
reached is an understanding of infinite otherness (that everything relies upon 
a certain differentiating cut that produces its other). As in the Lacanian 
traversing of the fantasy, science is not achieving a final breakthrough into a 
realm of noumenal substance, but rather an appreciation of absolute 
limit/infinity – the empty frame as the ‘object’ of all objectivity (an object that 
‘requires’ subjectivisation – the presence of the observer). From this viewpoint 
we might say that while Meillasoux still hopes for (unmediated/pre-subjective) 
objects, Hegel affirms that there exists only the empty frame. Or to put in 
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Lacanian terms, there exists only object-a (the counterpoint to the subject-as-
void). 
  
The Hegelian logic is also to be found in the recent developments surrounding 
M-theory - where ‘M’ stands for ‘membrane’ but which is also colloquially 
referred to by scientists as variously ‘mystery’, ‘mad’ and ‘mother’ – and the 
conceptual discovery of an eleventh dimension. This dimension is not merely 
one in the series of dimensions but is closer to a kind of dimension of 
dimensionality as such. If our universe is a membrane then the eleventh 
dimension is that which contains all possible membranes; in short, it is the 
very frame of the multiverse or parallel universes. What is found here is a kind 
of cosmic disjecta membra where the night of the world meets the night of the 
multiverse. This dimension is not a tranquil free-flowing realm. On the 
contrary, it is a realm of basic conflict and violence where membranes 
encounter each other as turbulent waves. Occasionally these waves crash 
into each other and there occurs a ‘big bang’ in which a new universe, with 
new forms of matter, emerges (potentially) as a by-product. Far from the 
cosmic harmony of the spheres, the multiverse is something that reveals the 
madness of the membranes. The dialectical twist here would be that all these 
M-mobilizations are themselves the result of an inherent failure/inertia: that is, 
a basic incapacity of the multiverse to complete itself – its dynamism arises 
from being essentially jammed. Of course, it may well be the case that M-
theory is ultimately wrong or incomplete. Yet the Hegelian wager is that 
whatever theoretical approximation comes to the fore it will always reflect this 
aspect of primordial constitutive madness and/or inconsistency. 
 
Against this background, the big bang can no longer be considered as a 
singularity; rather it is something that itself results from an ongoing process of 
splitting and differentiation. Our universe does not function in its own terms 
but is something that achieves its consistency through distinguishing itself 
from its Other. This can also be seen in the most fundamental sense of gravity 
that is neither internally generated nor closed within our universe. The 
physicist Lisa Randall (2006) explains that the weakness of gravity is 
something that results from a certain tensional differentiation wherein gravity 
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leaches into our own universe (indeed it warps and structures it) via the 
eleventh dimension and the presence of other (parallel) universes. It is the 
almost negligible differential force (the incredible weak filed of gravity) – the 
very ‘stuff’ of splitting and differentiation - that is absolutely decisive in the 
constitution of the universe. Viewed through this lens, we might argue that 
Hegel is the most consequent of quantum theorists. 
 
In Meillasoux, and even in Badiou, there is arguably an implicit kind of holism 
at play. Notwithstanding the emphasis that is given to contingency and pure 
multiplicity, the basic idea is that mathematics is capable of 
capturing/representing the latter in authentic terms as a full disclosure 
(Meillasoux, 2011: 103; Badiou, 2005: 43). But from a Hegelian viewpoint, this 
is not the heart of the matter. It is not that there are real contingent 
possibilities/multiplicities that are awaiting discovery by mathematics. For 
Hegel, the point is that such possibilities are the result of interior distinctions. 
Difference does not reside in any realm of the transfinite or order of being 
(and which would then be subject to representation). Rather it is an effect of 
differentiation itself: that is, a process of inherent tension, splitting and 
struggle. Taking Heraclitus’ standpoint that ‘everything flows’, Hegel affirms 
that the flows that take place are simply between something and its other but, 
crucially, within the something itself. This inward otherness – the essential 
contradiction of being-there – produces a basic alterity that drives every 
something beyond itself (Hegel, 1991: 149). Contradiction, alterity and 
movement are intrinsic; the very stuff of Hegelian dialectics.  
 
 
Much ado about Den - The Organon of the Undead 
 
There is no entity that can coincide with itself. And this also extends to nothing 
as such. Nothing is the mother (or, perhaps, mOther) of all differentiation. In 
quantum physics, the widely held view is that the universe came from nothing 
(Kaku, 2006: 93-96). This nothing is not simply empty but manifests itself in 
two distinct modes: false vacuum and true vacuum. In each case, the nothing 
reaches beyond itself and, along the lines of Hegel, externalizes its own limit 
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(its failure to coincide with itself) in the emergence of something. In a false 
vacuum, there is the appearance of symmetry and stillness. But, like water 
that is contained in a dam, this stillness is the result of highly concentrated 
pressure-energy. Nothing exists here in a state of compression and which, if 
pierced, can release torrents of energy and matter at an exponential rate. In 
this way, universes ‘can spring out of the vacuum almost effortlessly’ (Kaku, 
2006: 94). This is precisely the context for a big bang. In this aspect, nothing 
is constituted as an intense containment of (potential) something(s). 
 
In a true vacuum there already exists asymmetry and differentiation, but the 
total amount of energy-charge adds up to (near) zero - the positive and 
negative charges balance each other out. The true vacuum is a kind of 
dialectical reversal of the false vacuum. In the false vacuum, enormous 
amounts of energy are required to sustain its zero charge (absolute 
symmetry). In a true vacuum, it is the differential movement itself – the 
constant recycling of positive and negative charges – that results in the zero-
sum of energy. The true vacuum is analogous to a gyroscope in which, as a 
consequence of the continuously spinning energy, the forces balance each 
other out and a dynamic stability is achieved. In this aspect, nothing results 
directly from something but this time as something that is continuously re-
configured through cyclical motion. In other words, the differentiated character 
of the universe is one that is produced through drive and whose net result is 
zero. This nothing is the ultimate substance upon which the subject (as pure 
drive) can never finally gain and which, at the same time, actively produces 
the subject as something that is always in excess of substance. Differentiation 
in, for example, the form of fossils does not speak to any pre-subjective reality 
but rather to the paradoxical something-in-drive whose object-cause is 
nothing. The fossil of all forms of differentiation is differentiation itself. From an 
energy perspective, something is cheaper to maintain than nothing (the false 
vacuum). Something, as Žižek puts it, is actually less than nothing (Žižek, 
2012: 945). From the viewpoint of the cosmos, something-in-drive is more 
efficient than nothing.  
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We can also see how the logic of the two vacuums is played out in the field of 
politics. In very broad terms, totalitarian regimes tend to reflect the structure of 
the false vacuum in the sense that the state and the people are placed under 
immense pressure to ensure that nothing disturbs the power regime. With 
modern democracy, by contrast, the model is closer to the true vacuum in that 
the people are bombarded with demands to participate in all kinds of political 
and socio-cultural activity in order to neutralise any real action. 
 
In this context, however, Hegel can be said to have reached a limit and needs 
to be supplemented by Freud. As Žižek points out, Hegel does not reach the 
level of pure mechanical repetition, or repetition as its own economy (Žižek, 
2012: 491; Daly, 2007: 10). While there is repetition in Hegel, this tends to be 
of a transformative nature (Caesar dies as an individual but the title is 
repeated at a universal level). With Freud, and as developed by Lacan, there 
is a new and fundamental emphasis on death drive as a pure empty form of 
repetition that is self-sustaining (e.g. the compulsive gambler whose goal is 
the next win but whose essential aim is the perpetuation of gambling as such). 
In Hegel, the central idea is that being and nothing have to be thought 
together as a continuous process of becoming (Hegel, 1991: 141). This 
becoming is always towards something other and is the very basis of 
Hegelian dialectics. Here negativity tends to be thought in terms of the 
deforming and reforming of the positive (negation is always, at some level, 
negation of something). But as Žižek argues, this renders Hegel unable to 
grasp the ‘non-dialectizable core’ of dialectics itself (Žižek, 2012: 493). That is 
to say, what is overlooked in Hegel is the way in which negativity is not simply 
a transformational moment (or series of moments) but is also something that 
achieves animation in its own terms: the death drive of pure repetition. In this 
way, all differential movement is simultaneously accompanied by the spectral 
persistence of negativity itself as a kind of danse macabre; this ‘obscene 
infinity…of the living dead’ (Žižek, 2012: 493). 
 
This is also why we should be suspicious of Brassier’s perspective on thought 
and extinction. Like Meillasoux, Brassier maintains the capacity of thought ‘to 
think a world without thought’ (Meillasoux, 2011: 28). This capacity is derived 
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from what Brassier calls the ‘organon of extinction’ (Brassier, 2007: 239). 
Brassier begins with the Freudian notion of death drive, defined as a 
‘primordial pull back towards the inorganic’ (i.e. the way in which life is drawn 
towards the lifeless void or aboriginal death) (Brassier, 2007: 235). By 
securing this notion, Brassier argues, thought comes to the realist realization 
that ‘inanimate things existed before living ones’ (Freud quoted by Brassier, 
2007: 235). In other words, the death drive testifies to an inorganic order of 
things, an underlying objective reality, as the effective in-itself from whence all 
organic life (all sense of purpose) springs (Brassier, 2007: 235-36). In this 
way, thought is able to achieve an ‘adequation without correspondence 
between the objective reality of extinction and the subjective knowledge of the 
trauma to which it gives rise’ (Brassier, 2007: 239). 
 
But as Žižek makes clear, the Freudian death drive can also be given a 
Lacanian reading. In this context, death drive has nothing to do with any kind 
of organic death; rather it is an inexorable ‘will to begin again’ (Lacan, 1992: 
212) that persists beyond both life and death. The drive is not towards death 
but towards itself. Far from referring to an aboriginal death, the death drive is 
more an aboriginal cyclicality; a self-referencing incompleteness (an 
asymmetrical striving for symmetry) that gives rise to the tensional 
phenomenological field of subject and object-a. The repetition in the death 
drive does not mark an eschatological return to the in-itself of a pre-given 
inorganic-ness; it is the repetition as such which is the in-itself. The repetition 
does not testify to any underlying order but precisely the opposite: an empty 
stuck-ness that nonetheless persists. Put in other terms, what needs to be 
grasped is not the organon of extinction but the organon of the undead.   
 
The drive, or compulsion to repeat, is symptomatic of a fundamental 
blockage: ‘we repeat because it is impossible directly to affirm’ (Žižek, 2012: 
493). This blockage connotes a kind of pre-ontological excess. While Hegel 
does not directly address this dimension of excess it is, to some extent, 
implicit in his argument concerning the way in which being and nothing 
continuously interact in the process of becoming. What needs to be added 
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here is that (un-)becoming not only flows between being and nothing but is 
inherent to nothing as such.  
 
Žižek argues that there are, in fact, two nothings that exist in a relation of 
parallax (Žižek, 2012: 949-50). The Hegelian form of nothing exists essentially 
as a negation of something; an emptying of content. Yet there is also a further 
step that can be taken which is not exactly a negation of the negation but is 
more of a subtraction from nothing. This subtraction from nothing is neither 
nothing nor something, but results in a kind of magnitude-in-nothingness; it is 
the void in-itself that contains nothing as one of its possibilities. This 
nothingness is the den of which Democritus speaks. While nothing refers to 
(and depends on) the absence of something, nothingness-den subsists in its 
own terms as ‘a thing of nothing’ (Žižek, 2012: 60). Den can be seen as a kind 
of pure unrest that reflects the unrest of the multiverse. It exists as a pre-
ontological excess that overflows both nothing and something. It is 
simultaneously ‘more than Something and less than Nothing’ (Žižek, 2012: 
493), and inscribes a basic imbalance/disturbance in every world. This 
nothingness-den is not zero, where zero would represent a certain balance of 
inputs and outputs. On the contrary, it is that which undermines all balance 
and symmetry. Den is not empty, it potentially contains ‘everything’ in its 
aspect of non-all – the spectral abyss of inconsistent multiplicity that shines 
through all being. From this perspective we might also say that den functions 
as a kind of embodiment of blockage itself – a pure form of 
impedance/inconsistency – that continuously tries (and fails) to resolve itself. 
It is both excess and impedance that sets nothing and something to work in 
dialectical economies. As such, den is a primordial surplus without any 
original measure.  
 
The pre-ontological nothingness-den is the very ‘ground’ from which the 
dialectics of being and nothing spring; it is something that first has to be 
negated in order for nothing to emerge as a basic background against which 
something can then appear (Žižek, 2012: 945). Den as cause is a basic 
distortion that is not simply originary but is co-extensive with every order of 
being (in this respect it is consonant with the Lacanian notion of the Real). 
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The generation of ‘reality’ takes place as a distortion of this distortion through 
the presence of subject – a subject that serves to delimit a field of 
phenomenal consistency. Yet here we are returned to Hegel. In his 
engagement with the atomistic perspective of Leucippus and Democritus, 
Hegel affirms that the void and the atom, and the vacuum and the plenum, 
should not be conceived in external terms (as if the atom/plenum constituted 
an independent positivity filling up the negative void). For Hegel, atoms are 
not indivisible and ‘the plenum has likewise negativity in itself’ (Hegel, 1995: 
305). Far from being uniform or linear in its development, the plenum is 
inwardly (objectively) differentiated and there is no point of external reflection 
upon it. As part of the same ‘stuff’, our engagement with this plenum (and 
void) is equally one of differentiation and cut. 
 
In a way, Meillasoux remains at the level of the atomists. That is to say, he 
wants to provide a kind of external narrative, through mathematics, on the 
development of contingency. In doing this, he overlooks the contingency of 
narrativity/engagement as such; in quantum terms, the way in which the 
plenum is ‘resolved’ into a certain phenomenal consistency. His hyperchaos is 
ultimately a limited one because he does not take on board the contingency of 
differential cut (of narrativity/engagement); a cut that is effectively the subject 
in its incommensurability with substance. Science is not something through 
which we proceed to mathematical mastery or virtual divinity, but a notional 
field that progressively refines our relationship with the cut. All complexity and 
necessity is derived from the contingency of the cut. It is through this cut that 
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